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Abstract
Currently, pension providers are running into trouble mainly due to the ultra-low
interest rates and the guarantees associated to some pension benefits. With the
aim of reducing the pension volatility and providing adequate pension levels with
no guarantees, we carry out mathematical analysis of a new pension design in the
accumulation phase. The individual’s premium is split into the individual and col-
lective part and invested in funds. In times when the return from the individual
fund exits a predefined corridor, a certain number of units is transferred to or from
the collective account smoothing in this way the volatility of the individual fund.
The target is to maximise the total accumulated capital, consisting of the individual
account and a portion of the collective account due to a so-called redistribution in-
dex, at retirement by controlling the corridor width. We also discuss the necessary
and sufficient conditions that have to be put on the redistribution index in order to
avoid arbitrage opportunities for contributors.
Key words: Pensions, Collective mechanism, Optimisation, Redistribution index,
Volatility smoothing.
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1 Introduction
Pensions are in constant flux as insurers need to reinvent their products in an environ-
ment with continuous increases in longevity and ultra-low interest rates. At the same
time employees desire security in retirement in the sense that they could get the re-
tirement income they expect due to their past and current contributions into a pension
scheme.
With-profits contracts (or participating policies in the US) were historically a significant
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part of the UK life insurance product palette. With-profits contract generally consists of
a benefit if the individual dies within the term (term insurance) and a lump sum (pure
endowment) if the policyholder survives within the term. This allows the policyholder
to build up funds for a specific purpose such as an income in retirement. The important
difference in this type of contracts is that additional periodic return can be given to the
policyholder. In order to remove the short-term volatility of policyholder’s payout value
different smoothing mechanisms are applied in practice.1 A with-profits investment2
can either be conventional or unitised with the latter buying units in the with-profits
fund. In the past, with-profits contracts often contained guarantees, like for example
minimum guaranteed return, which allowed just for low-risk investments resulting in a
lower expected value of the final accumulated amount.
With the aim of meeting consumer’s needs in terms of stability after retirement, the
dynamic hybrid life insurance3 offers guarantees achieved by a periodical rebalancing
process between three funds (the policy reserves, a guarantee fund and and equity fund).
However, the investments are still made on low and average-risk products.
Currently, under the ultra-low interest rate economic environment, which significantly
reduces the long-term benefits, the insurers try to avoid guarantees associated to pension
products. Over the past few decades, in occupational pensions, traditional defined ben-
efit (DB) plans are gradually losing their dominance and there has been a shift towards
defined contribution (DC) pensions, where the investment risk is completely shifted from
the insurer to the clients. Under a DC scheme the level of the pension is uncertain and,
in general, without higher contribution rates will not produce decent benefits.
For workplace and private pension plans, collective defined contribution (CDC) schemes
offer a middle ground between DB and DC plans. Under CDC, contributions are pooled
and managed on a collective basis, and members own a proportional share of the aggre-
gated collective investment rather than individuals share of the underlying assets as for
the case of individual DC.4 The plan also has a target pension amount – rather than a
contractual guarantee-based on a long term and mixed risk investment plan. The way
CDC adjusts the level of current and prospective pensions mean that there is an element
of cushioning (smoothing) of volatility and much better long-term protection as the risk
is shared by the members. This is because investment risk is adjusted over time and
longevity risk is pooled across the membership. However, CDC entails some significant
challenges particularly regarding the communication of the benefit calculation to mem-
bers5, complex governance decision for trustees and high running costs that are likely to
make it suitable only for larger schemes.
1See Goecke (2013) and Guille´n et al. (2016).
2See Gatzert and Schmeiser (2013).
3For more details on dynamic hybrid products see Bohnert et al (2014).
4Collective pension schemes are also the dominant form of saving for retirement in countries such as
the Netherlands and Norway – countries recognised as having among the best pension systems in the
world according the Melbourne Mercer Global Pension Index (2019). See Bovenberg (2009), Hoevenaars
and Ponds (2008), Ponds and Van Riel (2009) and Binsbergen et al. (2014), amongst others. In the
UK, the Pension Scheme Act (2015) sets up a new legislate framework for private pensions encouraging
shared risk pension schemes and collective benefits.
5Members have no control over the attribution of losses and surpluses.
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There is a clear need of security in retirement, i.e. satisfactory and stable pension ben-
efits but at the same time the pension providers do not want to offer guarantees under
the current low-interest rate environment.
With the aim of reducing the pension volatility and providing satisfactory pension lev-
els, in this paper, we analyse a new pension design in the accumulation phase where
the individual’s premium is split into two accounts: individual account and collective
account. Similar to unitised with-profit products, the premia in both accounts are in-
vested in funds (the same or different ones). Depending on the performance of the
individual fund, some units are transferred from or to the collective fund. In this way,
the collective account acts as a buffer in smoothing mechanism for individual accounts.
At retirement age, the individual receives a lifelong pension (or a lump sum payment)
linked to her individual account and a portion of the collective account according to
a so-called redistribution index, a weight identifying the part of the collective account
belonging to a client according to her premium payment evolution. This paper builds
upon Boado-Penas et al. (2019) and addresses the mathematical aspects to determine
the optimal corridor for the exchange of units between the individual and collective
accounts so that the final accumulated capital at retirement age is maximised. As a
second objective, this paper discusses necessary and sufficient conditions for modelling
the redistribution index. Indeed, a thoughtless choice of the model might result in an
arbitrage opportunity for some members of the pool of contributors.
Following this introduction, the next section of the paper describes the proposed pen-
sion model in the accumulation phase. Section 3 describes the mathematical model of
the product and defines the target functional to maximise. Depending on the chosen
help/gain-sharing procedures the optimal strategy for individual accounts has a different
structure. First, we analyse a relatively simple case when the collective fund can never
be empty, which corresponds to the full guarantee case. Second, we assume that it is
not possible to get any help from the collective account if the total number of help units
required by individual accounts exceeds the number of units in the collective account.
Finally, we propose to use the redistribution index in order to specify the amount of
help the individual accounts are entitled to require if the collective account cannot cover
all accumulated individual claims. Section 4 provides a theoretical discussion on choice
of a model for the redistribution index. Section 5 concludes and make suggestions for
further research.
2 The Model
This section presents the mathematical formulation to determine the optimal corridor
for the exchange of units between the individual and the collective account so that the
total saved amount for the individual at retirement age is maximised. As optimisation
criteria, we discuss the reasonability and mathematically feasibility of the optimal mean
and optimal mean-variance.
For simplicity, we assume that the individual and collective funds are modelled by the
3
same Geometric Brownian motion, Ht, where
Ht = e
x+µt+σWt
with Wt being a standard Brownian motion and the return of the funds expressed as
ρt :=
Ht
Ht−1
− 1 .
We denote by k and −k the corridor boundaries of the individual fund, and k ∈ [0, 1].
The returns exceeding the upper corridor boundary are partially distributed from the
individual funds to the collective fund while the losses (negative returns falling out the
lower corridor boundary) are partially compensated from the collective fund.
Let denote by V jt the value of the jth individual account at time t, by η
j
t the number of
shares that belongs to the jt individual at time t and by Ct the value of the collective
account at time t with number of shares θt.
The mathematical formulation of the with-profit procedure is as follows:
• If ρt > k, then we say that the fund overperformed and a fraction of the surplus is
transferred from the individual to the collective account
1
4
(
Ht −Ht−1(1 + k)
)
ηt−1 =
1
4
Vt−1
( Ht
Ht−1
− 1− k
)
=
1
4
Vt−1
(
ρt − k
)
,
i.e. one transfers 14
(
1− Ht−1Ht (1 + k)
)
ηt−1 units of Ht into the collective account.
• If ρt < −k, then we say that the fund overperformed and in this case the individual
account creates a claim from the collective account of
1
2
(
Ht−1(1− k)−Ht
)
ηt−1 =
1
2
Vt−1
(
1− k − Ht
Ht−1
)
=
1
2
Vt−1
(− k − ρt) ,
i.e 12
(
Ht−1
Ht
(1− k)− 1
)
ηt−1 units will be transferred into the individual account.
The corridor boundaries make the funds change smoother. It is clear that, if compared
to the case with no barriers, this will reduce the realised volatility.
The transactions described above involve units of the collective fund in and out. This
mechanism faces a problem if the collective account is plundered by individual accounts
too often. It would mean that the individual accounts are not profitable and need a
continuous support. For this reason the choice of barrier is restricted to those k ∈ [0, 1]
such that the collective account does not loose money in expectation. This leads to the
following profitability condition:
Profitability condition: The set of admissible k ∈ [0, 1] is given by those k such that
E
[1
2
(
1− k − Ht
Ht−1
)+ − 1
4
( Ht
Ht−1
− 1− k
)+] ≤ 0 . (1)
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The idea of profitability is not new. For instance, in ruin theory the net profit condition,
that states that the expected total loss should be strictly smaller than the expected
earnings from premia payments, is required.6
At the end of the accumulation phase, at the retirement point, the total saved amount
will consist of two parts: the total saved amount from the individual account and a
part from the collective account. The part from the collective account is calculated due
to a so-called redistribution index, which we denote by J jT−1 for the jth contract. In
order to prevent arbitrage, at time T we use the redistribution index determined at time
T−1. The index is only updated during the accumulation phase when new contributions
(premia payments) are made and constant otherwise which means that it is discrete in
nature. For a more detailed discussion on choices for the index see Section 4.
The redistribution index might also be needed in order to determine the number of units
to be transferred into an individual account in case of underperformance if the collective
account does not have enough units to cover all occurred claims. This is critical as there
is a lack of analysis in both academic research and regulation with respect to the strategy
the insurance company should adopt in this case. We intend to fill in this gap through
some possible scenarios in the following section.
3 Maximisation of the total saved capital
From our model setup it is clear that the total saved capital will depend on the trans-
actions between the individual and the collective accounts as explained in the previous
sections. Therefore, the way the transactions are performed will impact the optimisation
procedures. In this section we consider three scenarios. First, we assume that the collec-
tive account always has enough units to cover all claims from the individual account. In
the second scenario, in case of an insufficient number of units in the collective account to
cover individual claims, no units are transferred from the collective fund. Third, we use
the redistribution index J in order to specify the number of units that can be transferred
to an individual despite the deficit in the collective account.
3.1 The collective fund is never empty
In this section we show the mathematical aspects of the maximisation of the total capital
at retirement point assuming that the collective account always have sufficient number
of units to be transferred into the individual account.This is a huge mathematical sim-
plification but if it can be ensured that the collective account never ruins, then this is,
in fact, satisfied.
Following a Markovian structure and the saved amount in every single period is opti-
mised independently from the past.
In order to find the optimal choice of the boundary kt−1 for the period [t − 1, t], we
will make use of a recursive backward search, starting our considerations in the period
[T − 1, T ].
6See Dickson (2005).
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The wealth in the individual account of a policyholder consists of the part γ ∈ [0, 1]
of the premia piind paid to it, the investment returns, and the amount transferred to or
from the collective account.
Vt = γpiind + ηt−1Ht − 1I[ρt>k]
1
4
Vt−1
(
ρt − k
)
+ 1I[ρt<−k]
1
2
Vt−1
(
− k − ρt
)
.
The wealth of the jth individual is denoted by V j (or simply by V in case we refer
to a representative individual) and the wealth of the collective fund is described by its
investment returns, the part 1−γ of all the premia piall, and the gains or losses from the
transactions with all the individual accounts
Ct = (1− γ)piall + θt−1Ht+∑
j
(
1I[ρt>k]
1
4
V jt−1
(
ρt − kj
)
− 1I[ρt<−kj ]
1
2
V jt−1
(
− kj − ρt
))
Our target criterion for an individual is given by
A(k1, . . . , kT ) := E
[
VT
]
which is to be maximised over all possible choices of boundaries k1, . . . , kT at every point
of time for every individual7 where the boundary kt is decided at time t − 1, i.e. Ft−1-
measurable.
Due to the assumption that the collective account does not ruin, the choices for the
boundaries are not influenced by the choices for other individuals. In order to show this
we define the function
Ψ1(k) : = E
[
ρT − 1
4
(ρT − k)+ + 1
2
(−ρT − k)+
]
= E
[VT − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
]
for k ∈ [0, 1]. We make an observation regarding the maximum of Ψ1 first.
Lemma 3.1
Define for arbitrary 1 < a < b
Ξ(k) := E
[
ρt +
1
a
(
− ρt − k
)+ − 1
b
(
ρt − k
)+]
, (2)
then the maximum is attained either at k = 1 or at the minimal k allowed by the
profitability condition. If the profitability condition is not assumed, then the maximum
is attained in either 0 or 1.
7Optimal boundaries will be chosen by the insurance company for the individuals and not by the
individuals themselves.
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Proof: Let f denote the density of the random variable HTHT−1 , which is given by
f(y) =
1√
2piyσ
e−
(ln(y)−µ)2
2σ2 . (3)
because H is a geometric Brownian motion. The derivatives of Ξ are given by
Ξ′(k) = −1
a
∫ 1−k
0
f(y) dy +
1
b
∫ ∞
1+k
f(y) dy,
Ξ′′(k) =
1
a
f(1− k)− 1
b
f(1 + k) .
therefore
Ξ′(1) =
1
b
∫ ∞
2
f(y) dy > 0,
Ξ′′(0) =
(1
a
− 1
b
)
f(1) > 0,
Ξ′′(1) = −1
b
f(2) < 0 .
Assume now k0 := inf{k ∈ [0, 1] : Ξ′′(k) < 0}, i.e. Ξ′′(k0) = 0 and Ξ′′(k) ≥ 0 for k ≤ k0.
Inserting 1af(1− k0) = 1bf(1 + k0) into Ξ′′′ yields
Ξ′′′(k0) =
f(1− k0)
σ(1− k0)(1 + k0)
[
2σ − 2µ+ (1 + k0) ln(1− k0) + (1− k0) ln(1 + k0)
]
.
The expression in quadratic brackets above is strictly decreasing in k, converging to
−∞ if k approaches 1, and has one zero point. Since Ξ′′ needs to change the sign in
order to be negative at k = 1 and k0 is a zero point, it must hold Ξ′′′(k0) ≤ 0 with
Ξ′′′(k) < 0 for all k > k0. It means that Ξ′′ after becoming negative once, at k0 will
stay negative until k = 1. Therefore, we can conclude for Ξ′ that it has a unique local
maximum at k0, it is strictly increasing before k0 and strictly decreasing thereafter.
Since Ξ′(1) > 0 we find that it has at most one zero, i.e. it is strictly positive after its
zero and stricly negative before its zero or alternatively, strictly positive everywhere.
Thus, Ξ is strictly decreasing until it reaches its minimum at the zero of Ξ′ and strictly
increasing thereafter or alternative Ξ is strictly increasing everywhere. In the latter case
its maximum is attained at k = 1 and in the former case the maximum is either attained
in k = 1 or in the minimal k allowed by the profitability condition. 
Proposition 3.2
The optimal choice for the boundary k is given by the maximiser k of the function Ψ1
and it does neither depend on the time nor the individual. That is, choosing k1, . . . , kT
such that they are equal and k1 maximises Ψ1 yields
sup
k˜1,...k˜T
A(k˜1, . . . , k˜T ) = A(k1, . . . , k1).
Moreover, k1 is either the maximal or minimal allowed value.
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Proof: Lemma 3.1 yields the additional statement.
We have
A(k1, . . . , kT ) =
T∑
t=1
E[∆Vt]
where ∆Xt := Xt−Xt−1 for any process X and t ≥ 1. We will see that there is a choice
of boundaries which maximises each summand and, hence, maximises the sum. We have
∆Vt = γpiind + Vt−1
Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
which yields by the tower property
E[∆Vt] = γpiind + E
[
Vt−1E
[
Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
∣∣∣Ft−1]]
= γpiind + E [Vt−1Ψ1(kt)]
for any t = 1, . . . , T where the later equality holds due to the i.i.d. property of the
returns. Since Vt−1 is positive we find that the maximiser k0 of Ψ1 is the optimal choice
for kt when maximising E[∆Vt]. Thus, we have
sup
k1,...,kT
E[∆Vt] = γpiind + Ψ1(k0) sup
k1,...,kt−1
E [Vt−1] .
Consequently, we find that kt = k
0 is the optimal choice. Lemma 3.1 yields that k0 ∈
{0, 1}. 
As we have seen in the proof above, by looking at the terms depending on k is sufficient
to maximise
M1(k) := {1− JT−1}E
[1
2
(
1− k − HT
HT−1
)+ − 1
4
( HT
HT−1
− 1− k
)+]
. (4)
Example 3.3 (Asymmetric boundaries)
If we drop the assumption of the symmetric boundaries and assume for instance −k
for the lower and k · p for the upper boundary with some given p > 1, we can get the
following result. Let µ := 0.015, σ := 0.03 and p = 2, then maximizing the function
Mp(k) := {1− JT−1}E
[1
2
(
1− k − HT
HT−1
)+ − 1
4
( HT
HT−1
− 1− kp
)+]
yields k = 0.03257 and correspondingly kp = 0.06515, confer Figure 1. i.e. the policy-
holders should get help from the collective fund if the individual fund goes down more
than 3.3%, and transfer money into the collective fund if the individual fund goes up
more than 6.5%. However, as shown in Figure 1, the profitability condition required in
(1) is not fulfilled. Thus, k = 0.03257 is not an admissible strategy. 
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Figure 1: The function M1(x).
As our target is to smooth the evolution of individual portfolios we need some kind of
penalty for high volatility in order to obtain a maximum. Such a penalty function can
be the expected realised volatility of the fund. Here, one has to decide if a relative or
an absolute value should be considered. We follow the relative ansatz. It means we
optimise
A(k1, . . . , kT ) := E[Vt]− αE
[
T∑
t=1
1
Vt−1
(Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind)2
]
for some weight α > 0 where we optimise the boundaries k1, . . . , kT at every point of
time. As such an α the insurance company may choose the desired proportion between
the mean and the realised variation.
We observe the following identity and define two functions
Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
= ρT +
1
2
(
− ρT − k
)+ − 1
4
(
ρT − k
)+
,
Ψ1(k) := E
[Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
]
,
Ψ2(k) := E
[(Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
)2]
,
for any k ∈ [0, 1] which allow to simplify the optimisation problem.
Lemma 3.4
We have
A(k1, . . . , kT ) =
T∑
t=1
E
[
Vt−1 (Ψ1(kt)− αΨ2(kt))
]
9
Figure 2: The function M2(k) for σ = 0.092367, µ = 0.06, α = 2 and J = 0.02, yielding
M2(0) = M2(0.1897). The profitability condition (1) is fulfilled on [0, 1].
for any choice of boundaries k1, . . . , kT . In particular, it is optimal to choose k1, . . . , kT
equal such that the expression
Ψ1(k1)− αΨ2(k1)
is maximised.
Proof: We have
A(k1, . . . , kT ) = E
[ T∑
t=1
∆Vt
]
=
T∑
t=1
E
[
Vt−1
{
E
[
Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
∣∣∣∣Ft−1]
− αE
[(
Vt − Vt−1 − γpiind
Vt−1
)2 ∣∣∣∣Ft−1]
}
+ γpiind
]
=
T∑
t=1
(
E
[
Vt−1
(
Ψ1(kt)− αΨ2(kt)
)]
+ γpiind
)
.
This shows that an optimal choice for kT is a maximum of the function Ψ1 − αΨ2. A
simple induction shows that k1 = · · · = kT with the above choice of kT is optimal. 
From the preceding lemma we know that the optimal choice of boundary k is the max-
10
Figure 3: M2(k) (left picture) and profitability condition (right picture).
imiser of the following (time-independent) functional:
M2(k) := Ψ1(k)− αΨ2(k)
=
{
E
[
ρT +
1
2
(
− ρT − k
)+ − 1
4
(
ρT − k
)+]
− αE
[(
ρT +
1
2
(
− ρT − k
)+ − 1
4
(
ρT − k
)+)2]}
,
Remark 3.5
The function Ψ2 is strictly increasing. Lemma 3.1 shows that Ψ1 is first decreasing
until reaching its minimum and increasing thereafter. Consequently, Ψ1 − αΨ2 is first
decreasing and may start to increase at a later time but this cannot be before the
minimum of Ψ1. Thus, the maximum of Ψ1 − αΨ2 as a function on [0, 1] is either
attained in 0 or after the minimum of Ψ1.
It might happen, confer Figure 2, that the maximum of Ψ1 − αΨ2 cannot be uniquely
defined, i.e. the set argmax{Ψ1−αΨ2} contains at least two elements, say k1 < k2. Recall
that maximising the value of an individual account corresponds to the maximisation of
the function M1 defined in (4) and leads to a bang bang strategy. Since, the individual
accounts yield the main basis for the calculation of the initial pension, we choose k1 if
M1 is decreasing and k2 if M1 is increasing in order to optimise the value of individual
accounts.
Example 3.6
Let us again assume that µ = 0.045, σ = 0.06 and α = 4. The penalised function M2(k)
is given in Figure 3. The maximum is attained at k = 0.1215. The profitability condition
(1) is fulfilled for all k ∈ [0, 1]. 
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3.2 No help if the collective account does not have sufficient number
of units
The problem of the assumption that the collective account can never become empty
is the fact that neither insurance companies, nor the employer nor the state might be
willing to cover the deficit if any. Therefore, in this section, we assume that in the case
that the collective account does not have enough units in order to cover all claims at a
particular point in time, no single claim will be paid. The evolution of the wealth for an
individual j is given by
V jt = γpiind + ηt−1Ht −
1
4
V jt−1
(
ρt − kj
)+
+
1
2
V jt−1
(
− ρt − kj
)+
1I[
2θt−1(1+ρt)≥
n∑
i=1
ηit−1
(
−ki−ρt
)+] ,
where n is the total number of the contracts in the insurance pool, k1, ..., kn and
η1t−1, ..., ηnt−1 are the boundaries and the number of shares in the individual accounts
at that time respectively.
Note that here we index the boundaries by individuals rather by time but new thresh-
olds can be chosen dynamically at discrete time points. The individual account under
consideration is indexed by j. On the left hand side of the indicator we find twice the
value of the collective account before any units are transferred and on the right hand
side the total volume of all individual losses exceeding the individual thresholds. If the
left hand side in the indicator is not bigger, then there is insufficient wealth to cover half
of the individual excess losses. In that case, no one gets any help at all to prevent the
collective fund to become empty.
Our target is to optimise the expected return minus the relative realised quadratic vari-
ation for each individual, i.e. we aim at optimising
E[V jt ]− αE
[
T∑
t=1
1
V jt−1
(V jt − V jt−1 − γpiind)2
]
for each individual. The problem here is the cross dependence among all individuals.
One possibility could be that all individuals use the same barrier, chosen by the insurance
company. We make a precise error analysis in the sense that we single out how much
an individual can improve and show that this depends only on the fraction of its wealth
compared to the collective wealth, which in a large community should be rather small.
We try to find a common choice of barriers such that no individual has an improved
target value if all barriers are increased or decreased a bit.
Our main result of this section, Theorem 3.8 below, states that it is optimal to choose
the same barrier for all individuals and dynamically increase the barriers if the amount
in the collective account is relatively low compared to the total wealth of all individual
accounts.
Following the same arguments as in the previous sections we can see that it is optimal
to optimise at each time step separately, i.e. at time t for each individual j we need to
12
optimise
E[U jt − α(U jt )2]
where
U jt = ρt −
1
4
(ρt − kj)+ + 1
2
(−kj − ρt)+ 1I[
2θt−1(1+ρt)>
n∑
i=1
ηit−1
(
−ki−ρt
)+]
and k1, . . . , kn are to be chosen Ft−1-measurable. Our target criterion implies that an
optimal choice of barriers is a boundary value or
n∑
i=1
∂ijE[U
j
t − α(U jt )2] = 0
for each j.
Remark 3.7
If a (possibly non-optimal) choice of thresholds has been made, then the indicator, as a
function of ρt is decreasing and, hence, there is some constant z
∗(k1, . . . , kn) such that
1I[
2θt−1(1+ρt)≥
n∑
i=1
ηit−1
(
−ki−ρt
)+] = 1I[ρt≥z∗(k1,...,kn)].
Also we have
z∗(k1, . . . , kn) = −2θt−1 +
∑
i∈I η
i
t−1ki
2θt−1 +
∑
i∈I η
i
t−1
∈ [−1, 0]
I :=
{
j = 1, . . . , n : 2θt−1(1− kj)−
n∑
i=1
ηjt−1(k
j − ki)+ ≥ 0
}
Note that z∗ is Lipschitz-continuous and its absolutely continuous derivative is given
by
∂kjz
∗(k1, . . . , kn) =
−ηjt−11I{j∈I}
2θt−1 +
∑
i∈I η
i
t−1
.
In the particular case that all ki are equal we find I = {1, . . . , n} and, hence, the
following simplifications
z∗(k1, . . . , k1) = −2θt−1 +
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1k1
2θt−1 +
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1
,
∂kjz
∗(k1, . . . , k1) =
−ηjt−1
2θt−1 +
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1
.
This reveals that if the same barrier k is chosen for all individuals and if the j-th
individual has negligible amount compared to the total amount of all other individuals
plus the collective amount, then the ∂kj -derivative is negligible as well.
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We can now formulate the main result of this section. Basically, we try to optimise
the choice of k under the constraint that all kj have to be equal. This does not allow
to optimise for every individual but we quantify that each individual cannot improve by
much if every individual has a small wealth in the scheme compared to the total wealth
of the scheme.
Theorem 3.8
Define z(k) := −2θt−1+k
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1
2θt−1+
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1
for k ∈ [0, 1] and
N(c, k) := E[h(c, k)− αh(c, k)]
where h(c, k) := ρt − 14(ρt − k)+ + 12(−k − ρt)+1I{ρt>c} for k ∈ [0, 1] and c ∈ [−1, 0]. For
a given value of c ∈ [−1, 0] we denote the maximiser of N(c, . . . ) by k(c).
Assume that there is k¯ ∈ [0, 1] such that k¯ = k(z(k¯)).
Then choosing the barrier k, for each individual at time t− 1 is near to the optimal
in the sense that changing the barrier kj for the j-th individual does not improve its
performance by more than
‖f‖∞
(1/2 + α)ηjt−1
2θt−1 +
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1
where ‖f‖∞ denotes the maximum of the continuous density of ρt.
Proof: We choose the barriers ki = k¯ for any other individual i 6= j. For the j-th
individual we are supposed to maximise the function
E[U jt − α(U jt )2]
over the possible values of kj ∈ [0, 1] and its maximiser is denoted by k¯j . We simply
write z∗(kj) when we mean z∗(k1, . . . , kn) as a function of kj and the other ki = k¯.
Define c := z(k¯) = z∗(k¯). k¯ is the maximiser of the function N(c, ·) and
|N(c, kj)− E[U jt − α(U jt )2]|
≤ E
[
1
2
1I{ρt<−kj ,ρt∈[c,z∗]} + α(|U tj |+ |N(c, kj)|)
1
2
1I{ρt<−kj ,ρt∈[c,z∗(k¯j)]}
]
.
Since U,N are bounded by 1 on {ρt < 0} we find
|N(c, kj)− E[U jt − α(U jt )2]| ≤ (1/2 + α)P (ρt ∈ [c, z∗(k¯j)]).
Remark 3.7 yields |c− z∗(k¯j)| ≤ |k¯j − k¯| η
j
t−1
2θt−1+
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1
≤ η
j
t−1
2θt−1+
∑n
i=1 η
i
t−1
and the result
follows. 
The theorem suggests a simple algorithm to find a nearly optimal choice, namely to
choose a sequence k¯n and cn recursively via k¯0 = 1, c0 = 0 (or any other starting values)
and define recursively
cn+1 := z(k¯n),
k¯n+1 := k(cn+1)
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for any n ∈ N. The value cn is the threshold where it is expected that such a downfall
of the underlying fund makes it impossible to cover all the losses from the individual
accounts and k¯n the barrier chosen for all the individuals.
8
3.3 Using a redistribution index if the collective account does not have
sufficient number of units
Another possibility to handle the situation of insufficient number of units in the collective
account is to use the redistribution index. If the collective account does not have enough
units, the policies with a deficit can, for instance, claim a number of units corresponding
to their redistribution index. It means the individual account has the value
Vt = γpiind + ηt−1Ht − 1
4
Vt−1
( Ht
Ht−1
− 1− k
)+
+
1
2
Vt−1
(
1− k − Ht
Ht−1
)+
1I[
2θt−1
Ht
Ht−1>
n∑
i=1
ηit−1
(
1−ki− Ht
Ht−1
)+]
+ min
{
Jt−1θt−1Ht,
1
2
Vt−1
(
1− k − Ht
Ht−1
)+}
× 1I[
2θt−1
Ht
Ht−1≤
n∑
i=1
ηit−1
(
1−ki− Ht
Ht−1
)+],
where kj = k. In Section 3.2, we prove that the optimal corridor boundary for the
return, k, is the same for all contracts in the pool of contributors. It means, if the fund
go down all individual accounts will produce claims simultaneously. However, the claim
sizes depend on the number of shares in the individual accounts and differ from contract
to contract. Therefore, some contracts might produce claims smaller than the number
of units in the collective account corresponding to their redistribution index and vice
versa. If the regulation requirements allow to entirely empty the collective account, the
following recursive procedure can be applied, see also Figure 4:
• Settle all individual claims that are below their redistribution part.
In Figure 4 the claims amounting to 4, 6 and 20 have the redistribution indices 0.1
(yielding 10 shares), 0.2 (yielding 20 shares) and 0.3 (yielding 30 shares) respec-
tively. It means these claims can be settled immediately.
• Adjust the redistribution indices of the remaining claims to the new number of
claims and settle those that are now below their redistribution part.
In Figure 4, after settling “small” claims in the first step, the collective account
has 100− 4− 6− 20 = 70 shares on its disposal. The redistribution indices of the
remaining two claims, amounting to 35 and 50 shares, equalled to 0.2 in the first
8Also, using the mean field game theory, where each individual has contributed an actually negligible
amount compared to the whole collective, optimisation of the barrier in this particular case is roughly
the same as ignoring the possibility of the collective fund to become empty. There, due to the fact that
the value functions for all individuals are equal, the optimality can only be attained by choosing the
same barrier.
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Figure 4: Redistribution of the shares from the collective account by a recursive proce-
dure.
step and should be adjusted due to the new claim number of 2. Therefore, the new
redistribution indices are given by 0.5 yielding 35 shares. Thus, one claim can be
completely covered.
• Proceed until all remaining claims exceed their redistribution part and eventually
settle them.
In our example, the collective account has now 35 shares. The new redistribution
index of the claim amounting to 50 is now 1. This contract gets just 35 shares
from the collective account which is now empty.
The above procedure serves just as an example and targets to showcase a possibility to
handle the individual claims. Therefore, the presented numbers cannot be considered
as realistic quantities. Also, it should be noted that redistributing all shares from the
collective account between individual accounts might leave the next retiring cohort with
small amounts of capital resulting from the collective account compared to the amount
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of premia they paid in if the size of the collective is not large enough. This would clearly
violate the concept of fairness and require intergenerational smoothing mechanisms.
On the one hand, the procedure of getting help from the collective account is a question
of product design but on the other hand, it should also be in line with the regulations
in place answering the intergenerational fairness and sustainability requirements.
The above described recursion could also be applied on the returns of the collective
account so that the main capital remains untouched. However, this procedure will con-
tradict the primary mission of the collective account - to serve as a backup for the
individual accounts.
Concerning the mathematical implementation of the scenarios described above, the
method is similar to the one described in Section 3.2. Neither the value function nor the
optimal strategy can be calculated explicitly.
4 Redistribution Index
The individual share on the collective account – A theoretical ap-
proach
In this section we discuss mechanisms for measuring the share each individual has on
the collective account.
We will work in discrete time T = {0, . . . , N} for some N ∈ N. There is a finite
number K of individuals which share a collective account C. At each time t ∈ T the jth
individual contributes an amount J jt . By Ct we mean the collective amount at time t
before individual contribution and Ct+ := Ct +
∑K
j=1 J
j
t denotes the collective amount
after individual contribution.
To avoid ambiguity we assume that J10 > 0, i.e. the first individual contributes at time
zero and we assume that C0 = 0, i.e. there is no money in the collective account prior
to any contribution.
The total amount Ct of the collective account belongs in parts to the individuals, each
individual owns a fraction ρtj ∈ R on the collective account and
∑K
j=1 ρ
j
t = 1, i.e. the
absolute share of the jth individual is ρjtCt and the fraction after contribution is ρ
j
t+.
(ρj0 is meaningless because C0 = 0).
We now introduce several rules which seem natural to impose.
(Cont.) Contribution rule: If the jth individual adds the amount J jt at time t, then its
absolute share equals its prior absolute share plus the contribution, i.e.
ρjtCt + J
j
t = ρ
j
t+Ct+, t = 0, . . . , N.
(Fix) Returns do not change the relative share: ρjt+1 = ρ
j
t+ for any t = 0, . . . , N − 1,
j = 1, . . . ,K, i.e. the relative shares stay fixed during times when no contribution
are made. (With this rule we will sometimes write ρN+1 instead of ρN+.)
(Mon.) More contribution means more share: If the jth total individual contribution at
any time prior to some time point t is higher than those of the k-th total individual
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contribution, then the jth individual has a higher share at time t than the k-th
individual, i.e. (
∀s = 0, . . . , t :
s∑
n=0
J jn ≥
s∑
n=0
Jkn
)
⇒ ρjt+ ≥ ρkt+.
(Add) New policyholders which are added do not change the relative share of the existing
policyholders: If an additional individual is added at some point t with no contri-
butions strictly before t and some contribution JK+1t > 0 at time t, then its share
at time t is strictly positive and the relative shares ρjt+/
∑K
k=1 ρ
k
t+ of the other
individuals is the same with and without the introduction of the new contributor.
(Lin.) Linearity of the contribution: If the jth individual contributed x-times as much as
the k-th individual at time t, then its absolute share increases x-times as much,
i.e.
J jt = xJ
k
t ⇒
(
ρjt+Ct+ − ρjtCt = x(ρkt+Ct+ − ρktCt)
)
.
Remark 4.1
The contribution rule (Cont.) simply means that someone who contributes x owes x
more from the collective amount at that given time. Rule (Fix) means that there are
no changes to the relative shares if the collective amount gains of looses value, e.g. if
someone owns 10% of a building and the building gains or looses value due to external
factors, then the 10% share remains fixed. The monotonicity rule (Mon.) means that
someone who has contributed more at any time up to a fixed time t also owes more than
someone who has contributed less. Rule (Add) means that the relative distribution of K
contributors is unaffected by an additional contributor. The linearity rule (Lin.) means
that at each fixed time the absolute share increases linearly depending on a factor which
is the same for every individual but this factor may depend on the number of individuals
or the time.
We believe that the (Fix) rule is very natural and violating it means that there is some
redistribution mechanism between the participants even if none makes any contribution.
Redistributing for no reasons seems to be unfair for us and we will always assume that
(Fix) is in place.
The contribution rule (Cont.) together with the (Fix) rule does in fact determine the
structure of the wealth distribution of the collective amount completely. Together, they
imply a unique mechanism for the shares which does satisfy the rules (Add) and (Lin.)
but can fail the monotonicity rule (Mon.). The latter fails if the collective amount C
falls between time steps, i.e. Ct+1 − Ct+ < 0 for some t. We do not claim originality of
the next statement which is known due to its triviality but might not have been recorded
somewhere.
Proposition 4.2
We assume that (Fix) and (Cont.) hold. Then (Add) and (Lin.) hold.
The dynamics of ρj are uniquely determined. Moreover, the dynamics of ρj can be
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described more statically in the following way:
We denote by Ijt the index of the jth person at time t which is defined by
Ijt := 0
for any time t strictly before the jth individual contributes to the collective,
Ij1 :=
J j0
J10
100
for the index of the jth individual at time 1,
Ijt+1 := I
j
t +
J jt
Ct
K∑
l=1
I lt
for any t = 1, . . . , N . The relative share, resp. the absolute share of the jth individual
at time t = 1, . . . , N + 1 is
ρjt :=
Ijt∑K
l=1 I
l
t
, ρjtCt = Ct
Ijt∑
k I
k
t
.
Proof: From the contribution rule (cont.) together with the (Fix) rule we find that the
new relative contribution is given by
ρjt+1 =
ρjtCt + J
j
t
Ct +
∑K
j=1 J
j
t
for any t ∈ T, j = 1, . . . ,K. This fully determines the relative share for each time
t = 1, . . . , N because by the above formula one has
ρj1 =
J j1∑K
j=1 J
j
1
.
It is straightforward to verify the linearity (Lin.) and the addition (Add) rule.
Now, using the indices above and ρjt :=
Ijt∑K
l=1 I
k
t
yields
ρjt+1 =
Ijt +
Jjt
Ct
∑K
l=1 I
l
t∑K
l=1
(
I lt +
J lt
Ct
∑K
l=m I
m
t
) = ρjt + J jt /Ct
1 +
∑K
l=1 J
l
t/Ct
=
ρjtCt + J
j
t
Ct +
∑K
l=1 J
l
t
and thus, this is the same ρ as before. This shows that the rule described by I yields
the unique rule to determine the relative shares (given that (Fix) and (Cont.) are
imposed). 
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Remark 4.3
The number 100 appearing in Proposition 4.2 is arbitrary and can be replaced by any
non-zero number.
It turns out that (Fix) and (Cont.), which describe the relative share at each point
uniquely, do not imply the monotonicity rule (Mon.).
Example 4.4
We will consider the time set T = {0, 1} and K = 2 individuals. The first individual
decides to pay 100 at time 0 while the second decides to pay 80 at time 1. The collective
amount is assumed to fall by 25% from time zero to 1. We find
C0 = 0, C0+ = 100, C1 = 75, C1+ = 155.
From this we find the relative shares
ρ1 = (100%, 0), ρ2 =
(
75
155
,
80
155
)
or in terms of the index I, rounded with two digit precision after the dot,
I1 = (100, 0), I2 = (100, 106.67)

In the above example, we can see that the second individual has a higher relative share
than the first despite his smaller and later contribution. For an investment which can be
precisely evaluated at every point of time this makes sense as the second contributor was
only contributing after the (disastrous) 25% downfall. For an investment which cannot
be evaluated precisely at every point of time this rule might be less favourable and the
monotonicity rule could be what is wanted instead. This should especially be used when
in a real situation the precise timing of a downfall cannot be determined.
Our result on possible wealth sharing agreement under the monotonicity rule uses again
an artificial index. This time, however, the index does not depend on the underlying
value and can be computed even if it is unknown. It also shows that there is some
sort of “artificial interest rate” which is added to the index. The artificial index can
theoretically be time-dependent, individual dependent and scenario dependent but we
believe that in practice a fixed value (e.g. expected return of the investment) would be
chosen instead.
Proposition 4.5
It is possible that (Fix), (Add), (Lin.) and (Mon.) hold at the same time (for this it
does not matter how Ct+1 − Ct+ behaves.)
We now assume that (Fix), (Add), (Lin.) and (Mon.) hold, that there is a function
F : T× RK × R× R× R→ R
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with
ρjt+1 = F
t, ρt, J jt , K∑
j=1
J jt , Ct
 .
Also, assume that F is strictly increasing in its third variable if the other variables are
fixed. Then there are factors ajt ≥ 0 for t = 1, . . . , N , j = 1, . . . ,K and one can define
indices Ijt via:
Ijt := 0
for any time t strictly before the jth individual contributes to the collective.
Ij1 := J
j
0
the jth individual index at time 1 and
Ijt+1 := I
j
t (1 + a
j
t ) + J
j
t
and the relative share, resp. the absolute share of the jth individual at time t is
ρjt :=
Ijt∑K
l=1 I
l
t
, ρjtCt = Ct
Ijt∑K
l=1 I
l
t
.
Proof: The rule implied by the index I and ρ as given by the index obviously satisfies
the four rules. This shows that they can hold at the same time.
Now we assume that ρjt is given such that the four rules hold and define
I0 := 0, I1 := J0.
By the (Add) and (Lin) rule we find that a newly introduced contributor at time t =
1, . . . , N has an affine impact with its contribution on its share, i.e. ρK+1t+1 = βt +γtJ
K+1
t
for some constants βt, γt which depend on Ct, Ct+1 and the relative shares of the other
contributors. Thus we find that
F (t, ρt, Jt, Ct) = G(t, ρt, Ct) +H(t, ρt, Ct)J
j
t
for some functions G, H not depending on J . The monotonicity rule and the strictly
increasing assumption on F yield that G ≥ H > 0. We define recursively
ajt :=
G(t, ρt, Ct)
H(t, ρt, Ct)I
j
t
− 1 ≥ 0,
Ijt+1 := I
j
t (1 + a
j
t ) + J
j
t
and simply observe that by induction we have
ρjt =
Ijt∑K
j=1 I
j
t
.
21
Proposition 4.2 identifies the unique rule from the two rules (Fix) and (Cont.) which
can be implemented very easily and it does not need any modelling assumptions on Ct
(i.e. how Ct+1 looks like given Ct+ and the scenario.) However, the rule introduces no
penalty for late contribution other than that there is no participation on earlier gains
(and losses). If risk is associated with C and policyholders are risk-averse, then they
tend to make late investments. For early contributions to become more appealing it
seems natural to use the (Mon.) rule. Since (Fix.), (Add.) and (Lin.) are very natural
rules one is obliged to use a setup as in Proposition 4.5.
5 Conclusions
The life insurance companies are continuously creating new products to cope up not only
with longevity but also with the period of protracted low interest rates. It is well-known
that low interest rates affect investment opportunities and, in particular, have a signif-
icant adverse effect on insurers whose liabilities includes some benefit promises such as
guarantees.
With the aim of offering an adequate level of benefits to the policyholders and at the
same time preserving the long-term solvency of the plan, this paper analyses a new
pension design applied to the accumulation phase from a mathematical point of view.
Under the proposed design, we seek to maximise the accumulated capital at retirement
by investing the premia into two funds: an individual and a collective. The collective
fund acts as a buffer where some units are transferred to (from) the individual account
when the performance of the individual fund is below (above) a particular barrier.
We prove that, in the case of symmetric boundaries for the corridor [−k, k] and if the
collective account never ruins, the optimal k for the exchange of units between the in-
dividual and the collective account is given either by the lowest barrier allowed by the
profitability condition or by 1. If the barriers are asymmetric, we might have cases where
no satisfactory results are obtained because the profitability condition is not fulfilled.
In order to incorporate the possible risk into the target functional to maximise, we in-
clude a penalty function given by the expected realised volatility of the fund. We also
show that in some occasions the maximum might not be unique. However, as the indi-
vidual account is the main basis to calculate the initial pension, we choose the barrier
that optimises the expected value of the individual account for the policyholder.
Due to the lack of analysis in both academia research and practice, this paper also
analyses the possibility of not having enough units to be transferred to the individual
account. The first solution analysed in this paper is the no-transfer of any units if the
number of units is not enough to cover all claims. Due to the cross dependence among
all individuals we make a precise error analysis where the same barrier is used by every
policyholder. The same barrier is a suboptimal strategy but the explicit solution of an
optimal k would require lot of computation and the improvement for the policyholder
would be negligible, i.e. the maximised amount at retirement would barely increase.
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Secondly, we describe a redistribution index that could cover some of the deficit of the
individual claims and could be applied through a recursive procedure. In this paper, we
also discuss the necessary and sufficient conditions for the redistribution index design.
This paper presents an innovative and attractive way to smooth the volatility of the fund
in the accumulation phase. Hence, the proposed product design should be beneficial to
both the life insurers − as there are no benefit promises − and policyholders − as the
amount of accumulated capital is more secure than in the case of risky investments and
much higher than in the case of non-risky investments.
Finally, based on the model presented, at least three important directions for future
research can be identified. First, another challenge in the accumulation phase is the
maximisation of the retirement capital through an optimal splitting strategy of the pre-
mia into the two funds, i.e. individual and collective. Another avenue for future research
would be to explore the redistribution index so that it ensures the intergenerational fair-
ness among the members’ plan. Third, it would be interesting to set up bounds for the
pension amount during the retirement phase so that the retirees have a stable benefit
level over time.
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